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Abstract: This paper uses the archival records of three entities successively carrying on coal and ironmaking activities at Staveley between
1838-1900, together with the findings from earlier research, to explore the costing information generated over the period 1690-1900.
We find a system of cost accounting, broadly defined, in operation
throughout the period, a large measure of continuity concerning its
basic features, and innovations made from time to time presumably
designed to improve its usefulness. The paper uses the results of this
and earlier research to explore the nature of accounting change and
draws attention to possible differences in the path of development
between countries. Further, we assess the significance of our findings
for present ideas concerning the development of cost accounting systems in Britain and the U.S., and argue for a broader view to be taken
by researchers into the nature of management accounting's development.

A previous article [Edwards and Boyns, 1992] examined the
accounting records of two vertically-integrated charcoal ironmaking enterprizes operating as partnerships in the Sheffield
area between 1690-1783.1 The main findings were that their accounting systems, each based on double entry bookkeeping, involved complete integration of the cost and financial records,
the identification of unit costs for raw material inputs, the use
of accounting prices to record the movement of goods between
locations in order to measure departmental results, and the calculation of input-output yield statistics for raw materials and
intermediary products.
1
These were The Duke of Norfolk's Works in south Yorkshire a n d the
D e r b y s h i r e a n d N o t t i n g h a m C o m p a n y l o c a t e d a r o u n d Staveley, n o r t h
Derbyshire.
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The present paper uses the findings from this earlier research together with the archival records of three entities 2 (two
sole traders and a quoted public company) subsequently carrying on coal and ironmaking activities at Staveley, in succession,
during the period 1838-1900 for the following purposes:
* to contrast the nature of cost accounting developments in
Britain and the U.S.;
* to argue for a broader view to be taken of the development of
managerial accounting than is implicit in the debate concerning the significance of events at the Springfield Armory;
* to outline and analyze the costing system in use at Staveley
between 1838-1900; and
* to assess the likely relevance of the data generated for the
purposes of planning, measurement and control.
INDUSTRIAL ACCOUNTING DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE U.S. AND BRITAIN
There is a growing literature on the development of cost
accounting and a keen interest in the extent to which failure to
respond to changing circumstances during the twentieth century
has caused it to lose its relevance [Johnson and Kaplan, 1987]. A
feature of this literature is the debate concerning the way in
which our knowledge of earlier developments can help to explain the nature and purpose of cost accounting and the process
of evolution into its present day form.
Much of the literature used as the basis for generalizing
earlier developments in English-speaking countries, post-1800,
deals with the activities of nineteenth century U.S. companies
[Johnson, 1972; Chandler, 1977, 1990; Johnson and Kaplan,
1987; Hoskin and Macve, 1988, 1994; Tyson, 1990, 1992, 1993].
Particular importance is ascribed to events at the Springfield
Armory. According to Chandler [1977, p. 72], "before the mid1830s the only industrial enterprises in the United States to have
an internal sub-division as extensive as that of Adam Smith's
famous pin factory were a small n u m b e r of gun making establishments." Features of the most successful of these, the Springfield Armory, were that it had a workforce of 250 m e n and was,
for decades, the largest metal working establishment in the
country. Chandler therefore sees it as perfectly natural for "tech2
The records for these companies are housed at the Derbyshire Record
Office, Matlock, Derbyshire and the Sheffield City Library, archives department.
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niques of modern factory management" to appear first in this
"important prototype of the modern factory" [Ibid., pp. 72-3].
If we accept Chandler's view that the scope and scale of
business activity is likely to have implications for the design and
development of the management information system, we might
expect to find differences between the U.S. and British experiences. Of particular relevance is the fact that factory development had begun somewhat earlier in Britain. Proto-industrialization during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries
had seen the emergence of the proto-factory, 3 involving a significant investment in tools and implements and a labor force assembled to perform specialist functions u n d e r supervision
[Flinn, 1962; Marshall, 1980, chapter 6; Mepham, 1988, pp. 578].
The pace of industrialization picked up in Britain during
the second half of the eighteenth century with the textile, especially cotton but also woolen, and iron industries coming to the
fore. By 1812, in the neighborhood of Birmingham alone, there
were 10 iron works, each of which cost over £50,000 to establish
and typically engaged between 300-500 workmen apart from the
colliers [Ashton, quoted in Edwards, 1937, p. 193]. An example
of an organization growing rapidly during the first half of the
nineteenth century, under the leadership of Sir John Guest, was
the Dowlais Iron Company which employed 5,192 people in
1842. In the same year, it was described as "the first [iron
works] in the world," 4 but it is not necessary to go beyond the
locality of south Wales for other examples of substantial British
Companies at this early date. 5
3

The first factory proper is generally considered to be John Lombe's silkthrowing mill near Derby in 1717. It was 500 feet long and, with five or six
stories resembled "a huge barracks . . . with its automatic tools, its continuous
and unlimited production and the narrowly specialised functions of its [300]
operatives" [Mantoux, 1928, p. 199].
4
Letter from S. W. Roberts of Philadelphia to Thomas Evans, the overseas
agent of Dowlais. Glamorgan Record Office, Dowlais main series letter book
1842 (2) f. 368.
5
The Plymouth Iron Company employed 3,900, Tredegar 2,757, Rhymney
2,494, Penydarren 2,071 and Blaenavon 1,971, while Cyfarthfa employed 2,000
at the forges alone [Royal Commission on Childrens' Employment in Mines and
Manufactories, 1842, Report of Rhys William Jones, Appendix, Part 2, p. 594].
The Report of the Commissioners for the State of the Population in the Mining
Districts, 1846, puts employment at Dowlais at c. 6,000 and at Rhymney c. 4,000,
of which 1,600 were employed in the mines. It is also stated that 1,700 were
employed at Dowlais in the mines, but it is not clear whether this is part of the
6,000.
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Given Chandler's [1977, 1990] assessment of the impact of
the large-scale business enterprize on cost accounting developments, it would be surprising if progress in this direction had
not been m a d e early on by companies at the forefront of
Britain's Industrial Revolution. Indeed, research has been undertaken which suggests that important costing developments
did in fact occur in Britain both prior to and during the Industrial Revolution [McKendrick, 1970; Stone, 1973; Jones, 1985;
Fleischman and Parker, 1990, 1991, 1992; Fleischman, Parker
and Vamplew, 1991; Edwards and Newell, 1991; Edwards and
Boyns, 1992]. Moreover, refinements of accounting technique,
of fundamental importance in terms of departmental profit and
performance m e a s u r e m e n t occurred in relatively small iron
making establishments [Edwards and Boyns, 1992].
This paper will present further evidence both explicit and
suggestive of the fact that this material was used for management purposes [see also Boyns and Edwards, 1995].
DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING —
SOME SUGGESTIONS
It has been persuasively argued that Johnson and Kaplan's
analysis of the development of management accounting in Relevance Lost [1987] has "placed accounting history centre-stage
not only in the research agenda, but also for practical business
management" [p. 36]. The result has been an upsurge of publications in this area and an intense and sometimes heated debate
[Tyson, 1992; Fleischman, Kalbers and Parker, 1992; Miller and
Napier, 1993; Hoskin and Macve, 1994; Tyson, 1995] between
Foucauldians, Marxists and economic rationalists concerning
the respective merits of different approaches to accounting history [Napier, 1989; Miller, Hopper and Laughlin 1991]. Calls
have been made for recognition of possible merit in more than
one approach towards analysing accounting's past [Fleischman,
Kalbers and Parker, 1992], and the late eighteenth century accounting practices of Boulton & Watt have been the subject of
re-interpretation as the result of collaborative research between
Foucauldians and an economic rationalist [Fleischman, Hoskin
and Macve, 1995].
Recent years have also seen an interesting debate in the
accounting history literature concerning the "genesis of managerialism" [Hoskin and Macve, 1994]. According to Chandler,
the necessary administrative co-ordination of emerging largescale companies during the nineteenth century was facilitated
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss2/2
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by the adoption of bookkeeping procedures based on "standard
double-entry accounts" [Chandler, 1977, pp. 73-4]. The Springfield Armory case is cited as an exemplar, with events during the
stewardship of Colonel Roswell Lee (1815-33) seen to have been
of crucial importance.
Historians of a Foucauldian persuasion [Hoskin and Macve,
1988] have challenged Chandler's "demand - response" explanation for the development of managerialism during the 1830s and
1840s. They agree that events at the U.S. Springfield Armory in
the first half of the nineteenth century saw accounting play a
full part in the development of "managerialism," but see a disciplinary power-knowledge framework as responsible for observed
changes. In the opinion of Hoskin and Macve, identified events,
which include the "West Point connection," conspired to produce "crucial discontinuities from previous accounting and
management practices" [Hoskin and Macve, 1988, p. 38]. The
major step forward comprised a new accountability based on "a
full accounting for labour productivity" [Hoskin and Macve,
1988, p. 38; see also Chandler, 1977, pp. 72-5]. In a later paper,
Hoskin and Macve [1994] have demonstrated conclusively the
fact that Springfield's accounting system under Lee was based
on the stewardship-oriented charge/discharge accounting rather
than, as Chandler believed, the potentially more commerciallyoriented double entry bookkeeping [1994, pp. 18-22], and have
further argued that it was "a revolutionary time-and-motion
study undertaken in 1831 which exposed the previously-hidden
problem of slack, and thus made it possible to engineer the
subsequent cost and productivity transformations" [1994, p. 6].
The time and motion study is thought to have been the "brainchild" of Lieutenant Daniel Tyler, a West point graduate who
joined Springfield in 1831.
The Hoskin and Macve thesis has been challenged by Tyson
[1990, 1992, 1993]. Tyson re-examined the Springfield archive
and concluded that there was, potentially, a managerial accounting system in place prior to Tyler joining the Armory, and
that subsequent changes in the use of this accounting system
can better be explained in terms of a range of identified economic and social factors. Tyson's findings have been stoutly resisted by Hoskin and Macve [1994] who re-assert their earlier
conclusions.
This debate is of relevance to our study for reasons which
include assertions made by Foucauldians concerning the nature
and purpose of costing systems uncovered by other academic
Published by eGrove, 1995
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researchers. Earlier costing developments in U.S. textile mills
are down-played due to their perceived inability to establish effective accountability in respect of workers and production
[Hoskin and Macve, 1988, pp. 70-1]. More importantly, for our
purposes, while Foucaudians have noted the introduction of
cost accounting techniques in British companies before and during the Industrial Revolution [McKendrick, 1970; Jones, 1985;
Edwards, 1989; Edwards and Newell, 1991; Fleischman and
Parker, 1990, 1991], the significance of these findings 6 has been
questioned [Hoskin and Macve, 1988, 1992] on the grounds that
they provide evidence of cost finding but not cost control.
We use the findings from recent research into the Staveley
archives together with our investigation of its predecessor companies [Edwards and Boyns, 1992] to question this conclusion.
We think that progress in management accounting history research needs to pay more attention to two factors, of which the
second is given particular emphasis in this paper. First, there is
a need to consider the possible significance of differences in
environmental circumstances between countries. For example, it
is plausible to argue that a country with a long industrial history
and steady rate of economic development in circumstances
where labor was relatively plentiful (e.g., Britain between the
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries) is likely to exhibit significant differences in the development of its technologies, including accounting, compared with a country which started m u c h
later but then industrialized more rapidly against a background
of labor shortages (e.g., the U.S.).
Second, while we share with Hoskin, Macve and Tyson a
concern with the development of accounting as a tool for management, we argue that it is a mistake to focus overmuch on
"using accounting information to exert human
accountability,
e.g., by e r a d i c a t i n g slack a n d increasing w o r k efficiency"
[Hoskin and Macve, 1994, p. 7, emphasis added]. The material
presented and commented on in the remainder of this paper
contains little or no evidence of an accounting system being
used principally as a means of surveillance of the workforce.
However, we argue that a broader view needs to be taken of the
possible nature and role of accounting systems both within and
between countries. That is, we suggest that management was
concerned to make the best use of available resources within
certain constraints, of which one may have been a recognition
6

Also, in the U.S. context, Porter, 1980.
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of the need to maintain harmonious management/worker relations in a period when the "governable person" [Miller and
O'Leary, 1987] had not yet been created, at least in the private
sector. We therefore take the view that it is unduly restrictive to
equate the development of managerial accounting with the
growth of scientific management, which is seen to have its origins at West Point and to have been popularized by Frederick
Taylor in the late nineteenth century. Rather, we take as a reference point the definition of management accounting which appeared in the report prepared by the team which visited the
U.S.A. in 1950 under the auspices of the then recently established Anglo-American Council on Productivity. It is the first
such definition of which we are aware that has appeared in the
British accounting literature.
Management accountancy is the presentation of accounting information in such a way as to assist management in the creation of policy and in the day-to-day
operation of an undertaking (1950, p. viii).
We recognize that we focus on a term "management accounting" which was not even used in the nineteenth century, but we
do not see this as a problem. 7 Our sole purpose is to discover
whether the system we have researched meets the basic criterion
subsequently articulated as justifying that designation. 8
In the next two sections, we present our analysis of the
system of accounting used at Staveley between 1838-1900. In the
final section, we emphasize the gradual evolution, over two centuries, of an accounting system which (our investigations of archives elsewhere suggest 9 ) had many features in c o m m o n with
that in widespread use among iron, steel and coal companies in
the late nineteenth century. Also, we make a tentative assessment, based on the limited explicit evidence available, of the
extent to which this system can be regarded as serving manage7

See Miller and Napier [1993] for a different view
In this context, we note a broad similarity between the 1950 definition and
those used by today's management accounting textbooks.
9
Bolckow, Vaughan and Company Ltd, Cleveland (British Steel, North Eastern Regional Records Centre); Consett Iron Company Ltd, Durham (British
Steel, N o r t h E a s t e r n Regional Records Centre); Dowlais I r o n C o m p a n y ,
Glamorgan (Glamorgan Record Office); Pearson and Knowles Coal and Iron
Company Ltd, Lancashire (British Steel, North Western Regional Records Centre); Shelton Iron, Steel and Coal Company Ltd, Staffordshire (British Steel,
North Western Regional Records Centre); and South Durham Steel and Iron
Company Ltd, Durham (British Steel, North Eastern Regional Records Centre).
8
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ment's informational requirements. We acknowledge the lack of
surviving evidence to demonstrate the precise use made of this
accounting information and refer to the contemporary literature
for illumination on this matter. In the final section we also comment further on the process of accounting change in different
countries and argue for a broad view of management accounting to be taken by researchers into its history.

THE INTEGRATED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
1838-41: Staveley Works — George Barrow, Sole Proprietor
In 1783, at the end of a 21-year lease, the tenancy of Joseph
Clay (managing clerk of The Duke of Norfolk's Works and the
Derbyshire and Nottingham Company) was not renewed and the
two partnerships were dissolved. Staveley was then leased to
Walter Mather who belonged to a group of capitalists that also
controlled foundries and mills in south Derbyshire. In the endeavor to improve profitability, the furnace was re-built to enable the use of coke instead of charcoal as its m a i n fuel
[Hopkinson, 1957, p. 117]. Following Mather's death in 1796,
Staveley was bequeathed to his sons-in-law, William Ward and
Edward Richard Lowe, though the latter died in 1800 and his
widow continued in partnership with Ward.
In 1805, Lowe's widow m a r r i e d George H. Barrow, a
Southwell solicitor, who initially took little interest in Staveley.
Bad management and a run of losses from circa 1810 encouraged Barrow to become more involved and, in 1815, he took
over the ground leases and assumed sole responsibility for the
works. George continued to run the business until 1841, by
which time backward integration had secured supplies of ironstone and coal from local pits and collieries.
The single accounting record which appears to have survived from George's proprietorship is the double entry-based
private ledger for 1838-41 [D3808]. Nevertheless, the wealth of
physical and financial information it contains enables us to construct a fairly clear picture of the nature of business operations
at this time, the flow of goods between operating departments
and stock, and the way in which costs and profits were measured [Figure 1].

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss2/2
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FIGURE 1
Staveley Works, departments and cost/revenue flows,
1838-41
Ironstone
pits (1)

Collieries (1)

Ironstone
stock (2)

Limestone
stock (2)

Coke
ovens(2)

Furnaces (1)

Pig iron
stock (2)

Foundry (1)

Castings
stock (2)*

Customer

*

Small amounts of castings were supplied and recharged to other departments
in the form of items such as rails, wagon wheels, punches, plates, p r a m
wheels, point plates, pipes, pulley wheels, washers, d r u m wheels and doors.
> Transfers at cost
> Transfers at an accounting price

(1) Separate columns in these ledger accounts list physical quantities transferred to the next stage of operations.
(2) Separate columns in these ledger accounts list physical quantities for both
inflows and outflows.
Source: Private ledger of Staveley Works, 1838-41.
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The main operating departments (each of which was allocated a separate ledger account) consisted of three collieries, an
unspecified n u m b e r of ironstone pits and coke ovens, two furnaces and a foundry. There were also separate ledger accounts
for stocks of limestone (purchased externally and subsequently
transferred to the furnaces), ironstone (obtained from the pits
and used in the furnaces), pig iron (produced by the furnaces
and transferred to the foundry or sold) and castings (produced
in the foundry for subsequent sale). Coal was transferred from
the collieries to the coke ovens, furnaces, foundry and customers.
The unbroken arrows in Figure 1 indicate transfers to customers at selling price and to other operating departments at
accounting prices, subject to periodic adjustment, which were
usually below market price. The outcome was an accounting
system which produced profit or loss measures for each of the
operating departments which interfaced either partly (collieries
producing coal and furnaces producing pig iron) or wholly
(foundry producing castings) with the market. The costs incurred by the ironstone pits were re-charged monthly to the
ironstone stock account, while the cost of coal transferred to the
coke ovens was, in turn, re-charged monthly to the furnaces
accounts and the foundry account based on their respective usage. The ironstone stock and limestone stock were each recharged to the furnaces at accounting prices, again subject to
periodic adjustment. In these cases, however, it seems that the
transfer prices were designed to recover the cost with any under
or over-recovery, so far as we can judge, affecting the valuation
of closing stock which was inserted as the balancing figure.
Each of the ledger accounts contains figures for physical
inputs [Figure 1, notes 1 and 2], while each of the stock accounts also contains figures for physical outputs [Figure 1, note
2]. The reconciliation of physical quantities helped to prove the
completeness of the record, 10 identified deficiencies which could
be judged acceptable or otherwise, and provided the data which

10
The exception is in the case of the coke ovens where the actual coke
produced weighed substantially less than the coal consumed. For example, the
charge to the furnaces for November 1848 shows that 549 tons 19 cwts of coal
produced 329 tons 19 cwts 1 quarter of coke. These figures are closely in line
with the expected input-output ratio of 60% [Gibson, 1922, p. 77], and we speculate that the numbers generated by the accounting system were compared with
this kind of yardstick.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss2/2
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we imagine were used to calculate yields. 11 The continuity in the
accounting system over time is worth noting. Between 16901783, the outputs of operating departments which interfaced
partly with the market were also valued at accounting prices (at
that time closer to market price than seems to have been the
case between 1838-41), while other transfers, such as ironstone
( p u r c h a s e d ) a n d c h a r c o a l ( p r o d u c e d ) , were m a d e at cost
[Edwards and Boyns, 1992, pp. 160-3]. Table 112 lists departmental results achieved at the main profit centers, together with
those of the farm, brickyard, lime kiln, and on the meat account.
TABLE 1
Balances of profit and (loss) extracted
from private ledger 1838-41.

Pig iron
Castings
Collieries
Hollingwood
Norbriggs
Staveley
Norbriggs New
Other
Farm
Meat account
Brickyard
Lime kiln
*
**

April 1838/
March 1839

April 1839/
March 1840

April 1840/
March 1841

£
4,893.9. 8
3,368. 7.10

£
3,669.15. 5
2,676. 9. 1

£
3,888. 5. 9
454.16. 8

£
643.11. 2
(50. 5. 8)

1,676. 1. 8
10.10.10
751.13. 4

1,577.19. 1
(206. 2. 4)
550.12. 5
(146. 1. 5)

836. 5. 1

62.17. 3

(121. 8.11)
(173.19.11)

(139. 3. 1)
196. 18. 6

(138.19. 4)
122. 4. 3

**
**

(131. 4.
(10. 8.
20.19.
43.12.

6)
3)
0
0

(181. 5. 4)

*
*
*

April 1841/
December 1841

*
*
*
*

Ledger accounts not written up for these years.
Ledger accounts not balanced this year

Source: Private ledger, 1838-41 [D3808].
11
We have evidence to show that they were made in earlier times at Staveley
[Edwards and Boyns, 1992, pp. 166-7] and also later (see below).
12
The contents of Table 1 reflect the fact that not all the ledger accounts
were written up and/or balanced between 1838-41, with the situation worsening
towards the end of George's proprietorship. Elsewhere in the ledger we find
material amounts of expenditure on fixed assets recorded in accounts which
were not balanced until the ledger was closed. For example, there is a Staveley
New Colliery Account and a New Furnace Account which, respectively, show
accumulated debit balances of £1,729. 17. 7 and £1,068. 16. 8. [D3808, Private
Ledger, 1838-41]. These omissions are suggestive of the fact that neither a trial
balance was extracted nor final accounts prepared for the years 1838-41.
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We can therefore conclude that the ledger provided a fully
integrated 1 3 record of financial and costing information. At
Staveley, the recognition of differential roles for cost and financial records was yet to arrive. The system of double entry bookkeeping had been modified and extended to meet changing business r e q u i r e m e n t s , a n d we can c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e ledger
remained the center-piece of the accounting system that could
be directly consulted for both the financial and physical data
required to inform assessments of the firm's profits, performance and financial position.
1841-63: Staveley Works — Richard Barrow, Sole Proprietor
Following a successful re-negotiation of the lease 14 in
1841, George transferred control of the Staveley Works to his
younger brother, Richard, who had been a "successful merchant
in the China trade [and] who made a second career in coal and
iron, using his mercantile fortune to exploit the potential of
railway development" [Chapman, 1985, p. 123].
For this period the series of private ledgers are supported by
journals and cash books. There is also a Capital Account Book,
1841-65 and a Balance Sheet Book, 1841-63 [D3808] which contain final accounts and related working papers. The system of
double entry bookkeeping appears to have been the same as
before; certainly the private ledgers were maintained on broadly
the same basis. However, modifications and improvements were
made from time to time in the system of record keeping. Also,
for this period, there has survived data generated outside the
ledger suitable for the purpose of assessing performance.
1841 innovations:
Following the change in ownership, certain
alterations were immediately made to the system of record keeping, principal among which was that limestone stock 15 and the
ironstone pits each became profit centers [D3808, Private Led13
Much of the discussion of the integration of cost and financial accounting
systems, beginning in the 1890s [e.g., Mann, 1891, pp. 631-2], focuses on the
need to reconcile, periodically, separate systems, or to ensure their correspondence through the use of control accounts. The Staveley archive draws our
attention to the possibility that, in certain industries at least, a single set of
books was initially used to meet differential information requirements.
14
The property belonged to the Duke of Devonshire.
15
It is possible that the balancing amounts (credit and debit) were u n d e r or
over-recoveries of cost rather than profits or losses, but this seems unlikely in
view of the magnitudes of the amounts involved.
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ger, 1841-47]. A further refinement to departmental profit measurement resulted from the decision to re-charge the furnace
and credit the foundry "for blast," with the amount put at £100
for 1844.
The survival of journals for the period post-1841 enables us
to examine more carefully the transfer prices used at Staveley. 16
For example:
* Coal: Journal entries for November 1848 [D3808, Journal,
1847-49, fo. 121] show that credit sales and "ready money"
sales of hard coal were each made at 6s. for larger quantities
and 7s. for smaller quantities. This type of coal was recharged to the "railway sales account" (a new profit center 17 )
and the furnaces at 5s. Soft coal was charged to the railway
sales account and the foundry at 4s., and this amount also
obtained for cash and credit sales, although 5s. was received
for one small quantity of credit sales. Cobbles were charged at
4s. to the new furnace and the railway sales account, but
produced 5s. from cash and credit sales. Slack was charged at
1s. to the new and old furnaces, but realized 2s. in cash and
credit sales.
* Pig iron stock: Journal entries for January 1848 [D3808, Journal, 1847-49, fo. 36] show pig iron stock charged to the
foundry at £4 per ton while fetching £5. 15. 0 per ton in the
market. In April 1849 [fos. 166 & 171], the transfer price was
£3. 10. 0 at a time when the Barrow could get £5. 10. 0 for
sales to customers.
We can therefore see that the transfer prices for coal and
iron were, at this stage, significantly below market price. It
therefore remains a matter of conjecture whether this discount
was designed to reflect the fact that a company (buying in bulk)
could purchase coal and iron at m u c h less than it could sell
them, or whether management made a conscious decision to
16
An examination of the accounting records of ten coal, iron and steel producers in the late nineteenth century has shown them all to employ systems of
transfer pricing though with considerable variety in the methods used to make
the calculations. It does not seem to have been a matter which received m u c h
attention in the early literature, and the first publication we are aware of which
deals specifically with this topic is Brady [1930].
17
We surmise that this term describes coal transferred to customers by rail
rather than used at the works or sold locally. This profit center was discontinued
in the 1860s when the entire coal profits came to be reported under the names of
the separate collieries.
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subsidize furnace production (where coal was the major input),
foundry production (coal and pig iron) and railway sales (coal).
1847 innovations:
The first set of final accounts for the new
firm was made up to June 30, 1847 [D3808, Balance Sheet Book,
1841-63] six years after the commencement of Richard Barrow's
stewardship. The accounts comprise a balance sheet setting out
the financial position at that date and a "Statement of Profit and
Loss" covering each of the six years since formation. The first
balance sheet shows Richard Barrow's capital investment at
£116,297. The profit and loss account was produced in what was
at this time a familiar format in the iron industry. It lists profits
or losses arising at each profit center which included, for 1847,
five collieries, several ironstone pits, several coke ovens, two
foundries; two furnaces, the farm, a brickyard and railway coal
sales. The final accounts did not reveal the calculation (costs
and revenues) of departmental profits and losses and it was
therefore necessary to refer to the ledger for this information.
An interesting feature of these accounts is the computation
of charges for depreciation and imputed interest on the capital
invested in fixed assets used by each profit center. 18 These were
then deducted from the balances for each profit center (profit or
loss) extracted from the ledger, and the outcome was a series of
departmental results which take account of both the decline in
value of fixed assets and the opportunity cost to Barrow of investing in the Staveley enterprize. 19 The depreciation rates range
from 5%-10% on individual assets, which is probably explicable
in terms of differential estimates of useful life. The imputed
rates of interest varied from 3.5%-5%. These were roughly in
line with central government interest rates 20 though we are unable to explain why different rates were used for different assets. 21
18

The detailed calculations were set out in the working papers u n d e r the
heading "Statement of Capital, Interest and Depreciation Accounts" [D3808, Balance Sheet Book, 1841-63].
19
The inclusion of an interest charge when appraising capital investment
proposals was quite common at this time but the imputation of interest in postfact accounts was rare [Edwards, 1989, p. 312].
20
The yield on government consolidated stock was 3.4% in 1847 and the
bank rate 5% at the end of the year.
21
The credit entries for accumulated profit, accumulated depreciation and
interest charged to date were, in the balance sheet, added to the figure for
Barrow's original capital investment. Also noteworthy is the use of the term
"realised" profit for the purpose of describing the figure for profit transferred

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss2/2

14

Edwards and Anderson: British cost accounting development: Continuity and change
Edwards, Boyns and Anderson: British Cost Accounting Development

15

1856 innovations: The business was expanded to a significant
extent during the 1850s as a result of opening up the Speedwell
and Springwell Collieries. The surviving records show that a
number of important changes were made at this stage to the
accounting system.
Using the accounts for 1860 for illustration purposes
[D3808, Balance Sheet Book, 1841-63], we find that the main
profit centers consisted of two ironstone pits, three collieries,
the pig iron department, the castings department, and the railway coal sales [Table 2]. The entire output of the two ironstone
pits, 26,745 tons, was consumed in the production of pig iron.
The total output of the three collieries amounted to 298,816
tons, of which 29,763 tons was consumed in pig iron production
and 4,089 tons by the castings department. The balance was
available for sale. The entire output of the pig iron department,
12,118 tons, was transferred to the castings department.
TABLE 2
Output, costs, revenues and profits, year to June 30 1860
Operating
Departments

Output

<
Cost

Per Ton Statistics
EstabReceipts Profit
lishment
d
s. d
s. d
1s.6¼
8¼
5s.11½
8¼
5s. 5¾
(1½)
1s.7
8¼
5s. 5¼

tons
119,708
68,391
110.717
298.816

s. d
4s. 5¼
5s. 7¼

15,778
10.967
26.745

13s.4¼
15s.9½

Pig Iron

12,118

64s.7¼

62s

Castings

16,118

99s.5¾

123s.11½

Coal
Victoria
Speedwell
Springwell
Ironstone
Staveley
Hady

Railway
Coal Sales

Notes:

3S.10¼

337,140

>
Net
Profit
s.
d
10
(9¾)
10¾

2s.7¼
24s.5¾

4S.0

20s.5¾

8½

'Profit' figure is equivalent to contribution.
For 'railway coal sales', only figures for total output and net profit per
ton are given.

Source: Balance Sheet Book, 1841-63 [D3808].
annually to the balance sheet, while a memorandum entry at the foot of the
general profit and loss account adds back the charges for interest and depreciation to "realised" profit to give a figure captioned "total" profit.
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In 1860, the accounting prices used to track transfers of
goods between departments were as follows: the pig iron department was charged at the rate of 6s per ton for hard coal and 5s
per ton for cobbles, while the castings department was charged
at 5s per ton for coal, presumably of a different type from that
used in the iron department. The entire output of the pig iron
department was priced at 62s per ton, which we know was the
prevailing market price as the castings account shows that an
additional 5,120 tons of iron were purchased from outside at
this figure. The figure for revenue in the colliery accounts is
described as "sales and consumption," indicating the dual destination of the coal for use within the company and transfer to
the "railway coal sales" account. Coke was charged to the castings department at 21s per ton, which may have been the average cost of production in view of the very small balances transferred from the coke account to the general profit and loss
account at the end of the accounting period.

TABLE 3:
Apportionment of Establishment Charges 1860
Establishment
charge

Railway wagon
repairs
Salaries
Railway repairs
Loco. repairs
Rates and taxes
Books, stationery
stamps etc
Manufactory
Gas Works
Law expenses
Schools
Donations
Cart Roads
Water Works

Proportion
for
collieries
£
s d

3,090 9
1,545 4
2,683 1
1,348 11
224
814
365
618
126
168
14
421
£11,421

0
6
5
2

15 3
15 1
4 8
15 1
8 4
11 4
0 11
8 4
5 1

Proportion
for
castings
s d
£
671 2
687 19
340 4
591 15
301 19
41
176
87
179
31
30
4
92
3,237

2
6
1
8
8

16 7
14 9
3 8
1 8
4 1
16 8
4 10
18 0
1 4

Proportion
for rail
coal a/c
£
sd
3,020 4 3

3,020 4 3

Total

£

s

3,691 6
8
3,778
1,885
8
3,274 17
1,650 10
266
991
452
797
157
199
18
514
17,678

11
9
8
16
12
8
5
6
10

d
5
6
7
1
10
10
10
4
9
5
0
9
4
8

Source: Balance Sheet Book, 1841-63 [D3808].
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The post-1856 accounting system so far described was
m u c h the same as its predecessor except that the transfer prices
were closer to market than had been the case between 1838-47.
It also contains four important innovations. The first concerns
the treatment of joint costs. A n u m b e r of entries for overheads,
which had previously been debited to the general profit and loss
account for the entire business and not traced to individual
profit centers, were now entered on a separate schedule headed
"Establishment Charges." 22 Table 3 shows that the establishment
charges (which cover some overheads of a general character as
well as those clearly associated with production) were then allocated between the "proportion for collieries" and "proportion for
castings" (foundries); i. e., nothing was charged to the ironstone
pits whose entire output, at this time, was transferred to the pig
iron department (furnaces) or to the pig iron department whose
entire output was transferred to the castings department (foundries) [see Table 2]. The m e t h o d of a p p o r t i o n m e n t between
collieries and castings is not clear and varies from 3.5:1 to 5.6:1
for individual items.

22
Interestingly, some of these entries previously appeared in the profit and
loss account as credit as well as debit entries, indicating that at least some of the
activities measured were treated as profit centers themselves, with production
profit centers re-charged for the services they received.
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TABLE 4
Cost of getting coal
Half year ending June 1856
Staveley

Hollingwood Victoria

Springwell

tons
44846

tons
31586

tons
26973

tons
9918

Wages, viz
Bank
Carpenters, smiths etc
Carters, labourers
Enginemen, firemen
Hanging on, bank &
weighing
Leading & stacking
Underground
Getting, including
head in stalls
Putting
Heading
Horsekeepers &
horse drivers
Engine plane
Switchkeepers & incline
Ventilators, airways
furnace etc
New roads, airways
Road repairs, road
& nightmen
Overmen, foremen &
deputies

1½

1¼

2¼

2¼

½

1¼

¾

½

¾

2¼

2¾
¾

3¼

1/0¼

5½

2/5½

2/1

-

3

4

3½
8¼

2½

1/4¼

7

-

5¼

2½

3¼

4¾

1¼

1¼

2

3¼

l¼

2½

5

1

2¾

4½

1

8¾

1¾

3½

½

Total wages

2/10¾

2/0¼

3/-

-

1

7¾

-

-

1¼
2¾

-

6

8¼

4/9¼

1

3/7

1/5¼

8½

6½

4/9¼

1

4/11¼

1¾

6/4½

6/1½

5/9½

Materials & Wages, viz
2¼
Pit waggons & repairs
1½
Pit timber
¼
Metal punchions
Stat. eng: & p u m p
2
repairs: & pumps
Stores, oil, ropes
2½
nails, candles etc
Pit horses & horsekeeping 2¼
¼
Pit rails
¼
Wrought up iron
¼
Castings
Carting
Rent of land &
¼
surface damages
N.Marriott's men,
¼
stone, bricks etc

2¼

2¼

2½

8¼

-

2¼

1¾

2

2

2

7

4½

5½

5¼

8¾

3½

¾

6½
2½
1½

1

1½

½

½

¼

1/-

2¼
5

4¼

2/7¼
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2/5½
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TABLE 4
Cost of getting coal
(Continued)
Proportion of Establishment
Charges
Railway Wagon Repairs
Supers' & clerk's salaries
Railway repairs
Locomotive department
Rates & taxes
Team Labour &
horse-keeping
Books stationery,
stamps etc
Manufactory repairs
of machinery etc
Gas Works, coal & wages
Law expenses
Stores, undivided
balance of account
Hollingwood boat level
Donations
Schools
Royalty
Current Cost
Interest on capital
Depreciation of capital
Total Cost including
interest and depreciation
Source:

2¼

2¼
2½

2¼
2½

1¾
2
¾

1¾
2
¾

2¼
2½
1¾
2
¾

½

½

½

½

½

½

½

½

½
¼
½

½
¼
½

½
¼
½

½
¼
½

¼
¼

¼
¼

¼
¼

¼
¼

2½
1¾
2
¾

-

1/-

-

1/-

-

1/-

-

1/-

5

2¼

3¾

2¼

6/-

9/7
9½
1/7

9/10¾
1/8½

10/2¾
7

3/5¼

½

15/0½

11/11¾

2
6/2

11/11½

Foundry Statements and Returns Book, 1856-79 [D3808]

Second, the journal and the ledger henceforth contain much
less detail than was previously the case [D3808, Private Ledger,
1856-63; Journal, 1856-59]. The ledger accounts contain no
physical quantities and, in the main, transfers between departments were made just once a year.23 Therefore, whereas prior to
1856 it was possible to find out a great deal about business
operations from a perusal of the ledger, the informational content is much reduced thereafter.
23
For example, in 1860 there was a single transfer from foundries to castings
on June 30 of £25,317. 12. 11 [D3808, Private Ledger, 1856-63].
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The third important change was the introduction of the
Foundry Statements and Returns Book [D3808] which r a n
through from 1856 to 1879. This document contains the physical data previously available in the ledger, and also a significant
amount of new material including comparative statements, for
similar activities and/or consecutive time periods, usually prepared on a half-yearly basis. The tabular presentation used is
illustrated in Table 4 which sets out the cost of getting coal at
four of the company's mines in the first half of 1856. It provides
cost per ton statistics for each item of input together with subtotals for "Bank Wages," "Underground Wages," "Materials &
Wages," and the "Proportion of Establishment Charges". This
tabular format was also used for the purpose of summarizing
the overall results of individual departments [see Table 2]. From
1856, the annual accounts also contain, for each department,
full details of costs and revenues. It seems likely that average
unit cost figures for production inputs contained in the Foundry
Statements and Returns Book were prepared by dividing the
total cost of each item appearing in the ledger and dividing them
by separately recorded totals for physical output. The emphasis
on physical as well as financial measures is implicit in the range
of additional statements 2 4 generated at Staveley on a routine sixmonthly basis. 25
The Foundry Statements and Returns Book, together with
the analyzed final accounts, therefore provide a clear picture of
both the nature of business operations and the financial interpretation of these activities suitable for the purpose of identifying waste and inefficiency (by comparing performance over
time), assessing the comparative performance of different departments producing similar products, and measuring the contribution of each department to overall profit.

24

These were: the get, sales and consumption of coal; cost of getting ironstone; cost of calcining ironstone; loss of weight on calcining ironstone; sales
and consumption of coke; cost of making coke; cost of making pig iron; average
cost of all descriptions of castings.
25
Examples of ad hoc statements prepared to keep management informed of
financial developments include: "Cost of the Construction of Lady View Engine"
[fo. 23]; "Cost of Making Brasses for Railway Wagons, Engine uses [1856-64]"
[fo. 193]; "Cost of Horsekeeping and Cart Repairs [1856-64]" [fo. 194]; "Summary of Expenditure on New Works from July 1st 1863 to June 30th 1876" [fos.
149-50]; "Statement of Capital [expenditure] and Depreciation to 30th June 1876
[1869-1876]" [fo. 151]; "Statement of Amounts set aside Yearly for Depreciation
[1869-76]" [fo. 152].
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The fourth and final change involved the removal of depreciation and interest charges from the final accounts. However,
these items continued to be included in the calculations of cost
contained in the Foundry Statements and Returns Book [Table
4]. Table 4 shows that the term "Current cost" was used to
describe the aggregate of the following costs, using coal for illustration purposes — wages, materials, establishment charges and
royalty. The term "Total Cost" was used to describe current cost
plus depreciation and imputed interest on capital employed. We
can therefore see that information was made available which
would have enabled Barrow to assess whether the total cost of
individual operations was covered by selling price.
1863-1900: The Staveley Coal & Iron Company, Ltd
Richard Barrow, having significantly extended the coal and iron
making operations, in old age with no heirs, sold the business to
a group of Manchester businessmen headed by Henry Davis
Pochin. The Staveley Coal & Iron Company Ltd was incorporated to acquire the assets of Barrow's firm with effect from July
1, 1863. 2 6 T h e w e l l - k n o w n V i c t o r i a n a c c o u n t a n t s David
Chadwick [Cottrell, 1984] and James Edward Coleman [Jones,
1988, p. 214] were involved in the promotion of the company
and in entering the originating transactions in the books of account. The firm, Chadwick, Collier & Co., was appointed auditor
and Richard Barrow stayed on as chairman of the new company
until his death in 1865.
The company was reasonably profitable during the first
nine years of operations, very profitable between 1872-75, b u t
profits then declined and were poor for a long period extending
from 1878 to 1889. The early 1890s were again highly profitable,
the mid-1890s a period of depression, followed by recovery
which led to high profits by the turn of the century.
There was a considerable expansion of activities in the years

26

The purchase price was fixed at £491,824, satisfied by the issue of share
capital amounting to £100,000 and the balance by installments, including interest, over the next six years. In line with the usual practice in Britain, during the
late nineteenth century, industrial capital (in this case £285,000) was raised
locally, mainly from the cities of Sheffield and Manchester. The new company
was quoted on the Sheffield Stock Exchange from 1873, later also on the
Manchester and Liverpool exchanges, and from 1899 on the London Stock Exchange.
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up to the end of the century, 27 but the broad organization of
business operations and the way these were reflected in the accounting system remained unchanged. Indeed, certain books,
including the Foundry Statements and Returns Book 1856-1879,
were in use for the period s p a n n i n g incorporation. 2 8 The
company's cost accounting practices continued to exhibit strong
evidence of continuity, with changes periodically made presumably in an endeavor to ensure that the system matched perceived
business needs.
One important modification was the re-introduction of a
depreciation charge to the annual accounts which were now
also prepared for external use, with the maintenance of capital
being a major preoccupation of the directors throughout the
remaining period covered by this paper [Edwards and Boyns,
1994, pp. 1163-67]. However, the practice of making notional
charges for interest and depreciation at cost and profit center
level was discontinued. The analysis of the e s t a b l i s h m e n t
charges between departments interfacing wholly or partly with
the market continued to be carefully carried out, with the basis
of cost apportionment now clearer.
In 1870, for example [D3808, Balance Sheet Book, 1863-93],
most establishment charges (salaries, books, stationery and
stamps, law expenses, incidental expenses — save for a small
amount charged directly to North Staveley Colliery — and travelling expenses) were apportioned between Staveley Collieries,
North Staveley Colliery, and the Castings department on a per
ton basis. 29 The tonnages were calculated as follows: for the
27

Between 1860 (figures in parenthesis) and 1900, production (tons, round
t h o u s a n d ) increased as follows: limestone 43,000 (7,000); coal 1,800,000
(299,000), pig iron 132,000 (12,000); and castings 69,000 (16,000) [Staveley
Works balance sheet books 1841/2-1862/3; Staveley Coal & Iron Company Ltd.:
detailed balance sheets 1893/4-1922/23].
28
A minor change was to allocate the "establishment charges" to profit centers within the ledger so that the balance in the ledger for, say, Hollingwood and
New Hollingwood collieries was after deducting establishment charges which
were, for example, £12,144. 16. 5 in 1870.
29
This basis was also used for railway repairs, schools, donations, water
works, and workmen's hall, although in these cases the apportionment was only
among the Staveley Collieries and the Castings department, implying that the
North Staveley Colliery did not benefit from any of these expenditures. Rates
and taxes for the North Staveley Collieries, which were presumably in a geographically separate location, were separately identified, whereas the amount for
the Staveley Collieries and castings was again apportioned between each pit on a
per ton basis. The costs of the manufactory and gasworks were apportioned
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collieries — their output; for castings, — the amount of ironstone, limestone and sand used to produce pig iron and castings,
plus the output of the pig iron and castings departments. The
logic underlying these apportionments is that establishment
costs were a function of throughput and that inputs and outputs
should be counted in only one department, so that all coal output was counted only in the collieries.
The a p p r o a c h r e m a i n e d broadly the s a m e at the next
decenniel date (1880) but there were some significant modifications. The total amount allocated to the castings and pig iron
departments, on the basis of their combined throughput, was
then split between those two departments in the ratio 2:1. 30 This
change was consistent with a desire to measure the profitability
of departments which interfaced at least partly with the market.
The decision was made in the early 1870s to expand pig iron
production by the construction of additional furnaces (see below) and, whereas pig iron production was insufficient to meet
the foundries' requirements in 1870, ten years later nearly half
of the pig iron output of 61,526 tons was available for sale. 31 The
allocation of the total castings charge between the two foundries
and the allocation of the total collieries charge between the ten
collieries and two coke ovens was then made on a per ton basis. 32
between the Staveley Collieries and the Castings department, respectively, in the
ratios 1:2 and 1:1. Because the term "Staveley Collieries" covered six separate
pits, the total allocation was then shared among them on a per ton basis.
30
Working papers show that the tonnage figure for castings, for the purpose
of the above allocation, was built up as follows: pig iron department — quantity
of ironstone and limestone used plus pig iron sold; castings department — pig
iron and sand used and castings made. This continues the logic of charging
flows to only one department, with pig iron used to produce castings counted
only in the latter department. Why these figures were then combined and the
allocation instead m a d e between castings and pig iron on a 2:1 basis is not clear,
but it certainly affected the allocation as ironstone used was comfortably the
largest of the relevant throughputs.
31
Other changes in the apportionment of establishment charges were as
follows: rates and taxes were identified with each major center of activity; the
cost of the manufacture was charged entirely to castings, save what appear to be
notional charges of £200 and £50 respectively to collieries and pig iron; one half
of the gas works expense was charged to castings — the basis for allocating the
other half between collieries and pig iron is impossible to discern as is the
method of splitting law expenses among all three departments.
32
It is interesting to note that, despite the emphasis on producing costing
data, there does not seem to have been quite so much concern with its reliability. An apparent weakness was the inclusion in the department accounts of large
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It is difficult to find any rational explanation for the allocation of establishment costs only to departments interfacing with
the market. In circumstances where transfers were made at a
figure designed to reflect market price, one would expect cost to
be allocated between all operating activities in order to discover
whether total departmental cost was covered by departmental
revenue. It might be argued that establishment costs were not
charged to departments transferring all their output internally
on the grounds that such costs were unavoidable, and the essential question was whether production made a contribution to
overall company profits. A problem with this line of argument,
however, is that not all fixed costs were included under the
heading of establishment charges. It might also be pointed out
that the method adopted would have had greater logic if all
transfers were made at cost; in such circumstances there would
be little point in allocating to departments expenditure which
would then be transferred, in total, to the next department down
the line.
The method used to value interdepartmental transfers became the subject of the board's attention at a meeting held on
November 22, 1875 [D3808, Minute Book, 1871-75]. A question
arose as to the price charged for ironstone to the furnaces, and
the secretary confirmed that it was charged at cost price. Following a discussion of which the details were not minuted, "it
was resolved that, in future, the furnace should be debited at the
market price so as to show if there was a gain or loss by the
undertaking." At the next monthly board meeting, held on December 20, 1875, it was further resolved "that the system of
book-keeping laid down by the board at its last meeting in respect of the Frodingham Glebe ironstone be applied to lime,
sand, bricks, and all other materials supplied from one department of the company to another department as far as practicable." 33
We might assume that the outcome was the production of
more relevant data for assessment and decision making pur-

write-off's of capital expenditure from 1885 to 1900 amounting in total to
£246,380. However, a record was maintained of such amounts written off, and it
would presumably have been possible to interpret the calculations of departmental profit and unit cost in the light of this knowledge.
33
We saw, above, that the lime kiln and the brickyard had previoulsy been
treated as separate profit centers in the period 1838-41.
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poses. And we might surmise that the downturn in profitability,
in 1875, following four very good years focused the minds of
management more sharply on the need for meaningful accounting information. The report made by the directors to the shareholders at the end of the year contains the following passage of
relevance in this context:
the extraordinary inflation of the Coal and Iron trades
must inevitably lead to very great competition in the
future, and there is not the slightest doubt that the development of the iron and coal trades is now far in
excess of the requirements of the trade of the country. 34
The analysis considered so far cover periods of six months
or a year. Evidence survives for the late-nineteenth century of
attempts also made to monitor performance on a weekly or
monthly basis. 35 Weekly Cost Books detailing operations of individual furnaces cover discontinuous time periods between 18851933; the first was for the period November 21, 1885 to January
3, 1891 [D1185]. There is a weekly sheet for each of the three
furnaces then in blast which contains unit cost data broadly
similar to that appearing in the Foundry Statements and Returns Book. 36 In addition, the weekly sheet shows yield data for
individual inputs and a column for "remarks" which provided a
record of events to help explain increases/decreases in cost/
profit. For example, the entry for March 27, 1886 reads: "No 2
furnace stood 124 hours for repairs and alterations to throat.
Blast off 5 am Monday March 22nd. Blast on 9 am Saturday
March 27th."
Also relevant for the purpose of monitoring performance
was the analysis book [Sheffield City Library, SIR31] kept by the
company's accountant, Robinson. It contains a miscellaneous
range of calculations, records and analyzes for 1879 onwards,
including the following items:
* Calculations of the comparative make of pig iron taking four
months of 1879 and five months for each of the following two
34
Shareholders were also warned that "profits obtained during the past year
are due, in a great measure, to the very favourable contracts which remained
unexecuted at the commencement of the financial year."
35
It is of course a possibility that financial statements covering shorter periods than six months were prepared before 1879, but that they have not survived.
36
One difference was the inclusion of a single round sum for establishment
charges which began at £90 per week and was increased to £140 in June 1886
when the number of furnaces in blast was reduced from three to two.
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years. In the first year there were five furnaces in operation,
in 1880 six furnaces, and in the following two years seven
furnaces. Calculations were made of the average make per
furnace per m o n t h and per day, presumably to enable valid
comparisons to be made and conclusions drawn.
* A comparison, based on a m o n t h in 1883, of the cost of coke
used to smelt a ton of pig iron. The results were Ireland coke,
2s 6.91d; Wells and Company's coke, 2s 1.53d and Springwell
coke, 1s 11.61d. The conclusion reached was that Wells was
1 9 ¾ % better than Ireland, Springwell 2 5 ¾ % better than Ireland and 71/3% better than Wells.
* An analysis of activity at the new foundry where pipes and
castings were manufactured. Statements were prepared for
four or five-week periods, commencing the four weeks ending
April 25, 1896 and continuing until 1900. They show the tonnage of pipes and castings manufactured, and cost per ton in
respect of the following expenses: coal and iron, establishment charges, haulage, wages, fuel, land and manure, carbon,
timber, repair, sundries, stores, wrought iron, steel and brass.
There then follows a statement which shows for various employees, the tonnage manufactured, total cost and cost per
ton. At the bottom of the sheet total and unit cost was compared with sales figures to give a profit figure. There is a
similar analysis for the old foundry.
ACCOUNTING DATA AND STRATEGIC
DECISION MAKING — 1863-1900
During the period 1863-1900, there is m u c h evidence of the
use of ad hoc accounting reports to help tackle pressing business
problems. It is instructional to refer to some of these reports, as
they provide an indication of the topics considered deserving of
top management attention, of the use made of accounting data,
and of strategic decisions reached which influenced the longterm developments at Staveley.
Soon after the Staveley Coal & Iron Company Ltd was incorporated, its board of directors realized that expenditure was
needed both to improve the infrastructure of the company and
to ensure its longer-term viability and position in the industry.
Planning was difficult in the nineteenth century iron and coal
industries, with demand fluctuating considerably in response to
changing business conditions. It was therefore important to
structure the business so as to achieve maximum production
flexibility while, at the same time, balancing the needs and capahttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss2/2
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bilities of the various departments. In this context, there was a
need to operate a sufficient n u m b e r of furnaces to be able to
match those in blast with current requirements, and to have
available a guaranteed supply of essential materials — coal,
ironstone and coke.
The second directors' report, for the year to June 30, 1865,
indicates that the developmental process was already underway
with the purchase of the North Staveley Collieries at Aston for
£25,353, an acquisition which proved of inestimable value to the
company. A report from Markham to the board, dated December 16, 1867, contained an estimate of the additional cost that
would be required to increase the production of coal by 25%
from the present level of 800,000 tons per annum. As the existing collieries were working at or near full capacity, Markham
advocated three initiatives designed to achieve the desired objective: the sinking of an additional pit at Hollingwood; increased
production at North Staveley; and a new sinking at Waterloo to
be worked in connection with the Springwell Colliery. Markham
then turned to an examination of the resource implications of
any decision to expand production. The analysis identifies, in
detail, the cost of sinking the new pit and further essential, related expenditure on colliers' cottages (it being increasingly difficult to get colliers to travel from u r b a n centers where jobs were
becoming more readily available) and railway wagons. The estimated financial requirements were £100,000, made up of 200
cottages at £90,600 railway wagons at £70, and the new sinking
at £40,000 [Report, December 16, 1867, p. 7].
A further important strategic decision, reported by the directors in 1870, was to build two additional furnaces, making six
in all (further increased to eight by 1874) in order to reduce the
amount of pig iron which, as noted above, needed to be purchased from outside at this time. We can infer the use of routinely generated internal costings to help reach this decision
from the directors' observation that the company "can manufacture pig iron as cheap as other firms . . . [and] . . . are of opinion
that an increased production of pig iron will be attended with
profitable results" [Directors' Report, 1870]. Markham's knowledge of relative costs is also demonstrated by his claim that, in
1874, the company could make pig iron as cheaply as its north
of England competitors [Chapman, 1981, p. 78]. Later, in 1885,
Markham maintained that "nearly all Derbyshire furnaces were
smelting at a loss and that Staveley was one of the few that
could show any kind of profit margin" [Ibid., p. 79].
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It is interesting to speculate on the extent to which cost and
profit data for individual companies were readily available. It is
difficult to believe that firms were comfortable with the idea of
such information being made available to competitors. But iron
and coal were close-knit industries at this time, with the same
people on the boards of competing concerns (and probably
holding significant shareholdings in each of them) and companies using the same business advizers (the services of William
Armstrong 37 and Chadwick, for example, were widely sought after). It is therefore likely to have proved difficult to prevent
information drift, even when determined efforts were m a d e to
prevent this happening. For example, on February 2, 1895
[D3808, Minute Book, 1888-95], the board "resolved that none
of the costs of the company to be communicated by any of the
officials to anyone without the previous consent of the board."
Capital expenditures, once made, were then carefully monitored. A report from Markham to the board, dated January 20,
1868, re-examines an estimate of £73,000 made on August 27,
1866 to cover a range of expenditure including new pumping
engines for the Speedwell and Seymour pits, the development of
the North Staveley Collieries, and the Waterloo sinking. The
remaining work outstanding, together with revised estimates,
indicated further necessary expenditure totaling £60,800 [p. 16].
Markham believed that, although the company had sufficient
money to finance operating activities, it would be necessary to
provide separately for the above expenditure "which cannot be
postponed with advantage" [p. 16]. The directors' minutes for
October 19, 1868 [D3808, Minute Book 1866-71] show that expenditure was carefully monitored, with Markham explaining
that his January estimate would not be significantly exceeded. 38
There are a number of other references to monitoring the cost of
new projects, and the process was formalized by a board minute
of November 24, 1891 [D3808, Minute Book 1888-95] by which
37
Armstrong, an engineering consultant based in Ferry Hill, Durham, was
engaged by companies in the north east of England for a variety of business
purposes. At Staveley, he was engaged to value the collieries and ironworks at
the date of incorporation and to advise, subsequently, on the company's depreciation policy. At Bolckow Vaughan, Armstrong was consulted on a wider range
of matters, including cost levels. The arrangement with Armstrong entered into
in 1869 is detailed at the directors' meeting held on 21 April [directors' minute
book n u m b e r 2].
38
The then current position was that £17,170 had been spent and he estimated that £46,250 was required to complete the work.
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"The secretary was instructed to keep a book for presentation to
the board of all authorised expenditures, the estimated cost and
the actual expenditure."
In addition to estimates of the cost of new investments,
there is evidence of formal attempts made to evaluate the impact of a new scheme on the company's financial position. In his
report dated December 16, 1867, for example, Markham informed the board that a new blowing engine was being constructed. His preoccupation with financial stability may be inferred from the use of the payback method of capital investment
appraisal to evaluate the financial implications of this project:
"Even in the present depressed state of trade I believe the additional furnace that has been put up will save the Company [in]
the first year of its working one half of the present outlay of
capital that has been incurred" [p. 9]. It appears that the rapid
recovery of the investment was possible because the company
was able to manufacture iron at a price 10s less than they could
buy it outside [Ibid.].
A board minute dated September 21, 1868 [D3808, Minute
Book 1866-71] focuses on the financial implications of a proposal to change operating procedures. Under the heading "Blast
furnaces gas, reduction in production of iron," Markham reported that workers "have taken gas from two of the furnaces
and are burning it under the stoves and three boilers." Further,
that results
so far appear to establish the fact that the production of
iron from the furnaces is materially reduced, and that
the quantity of coal used in the furnaces has increased.
A statement has been prepared showing that the make
of the furnaces monthly since n u m b e r three furnace
was blown in, and a note made when the gas was taken
off from each of the furnaces and the results appear to
be unsatisfactory. The make-up of iron for the past
month has been at the rate of £2. 12. 11¼ per ton. The
coal and ironstone have both been charged at reduced
rates as compared with the corresponding period of last
year, consequently the cost compared with the other
period has materially increased.
The value of the small coals to the boilers is comparatively small, and the fact that we have made our
iron at about 48s per ton with a considerable portion of
our own stone, renders it essential that the whole of the
question, should be examined with great care.
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A further illustration of the use of accounting data for strategic decision making is implicit in the following entry in the
directors' minutes under the heading "Blast furnaces." M a r k h a m
reported on and "referred to the stock of pig iron on hand:
owing to the unremunerative prices to be obtained and the decreased demand in the present state of the trade, he considered
it advisable to blow some of the furnaces out in preference to
increasing the stock, which was chiefly 'forge', as he did not
think it would be sold for some time to come owing to the
change going on in the trade" [D3808, Minute Book 1866-71,
June 23, 1879].
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
The Role of

Accounting

Questions which we attempt to explore further here are,
who used cost accounting data for decision making, for what
purpose, and was it relevant? The d o m i n a n t personality at
Staveley between 1863 and his death in 1888 was Charles
Markham. He was recruited by Pochin from the Midland Railway Company where he was one of its senior engineers. As was
c o m m o n in the iron and coal industry, the Managing Director
(more often carrying the title General Manager at this time)
produced a monthly report for the board. No copies of those
prepared at Staveley have survived, and we can only speculate as
to their accounting content based on the few references made to
Markham's reports in the board minutes.
Of most interest in the present context is that, in response
to a request made on February 17, 1868 [D3808, Minute Book
1866-71], Markham presented the board [March 16, 1868] with
a statement showing the comparative cost of getting coal, and of
the sales and profit for each of the four years ending June 1867.
We do not know whether this was a regular occurrence, but lack
of board comment on such matters suggests that it was not. We
therefore conclude that at Staveley the day-to-day management
of the works was the responsibility of Markham and his deputies
who headed individual departments.
Turning to decisions of a strategic character, which usually
involved financial outlay, we find the board m e m b e r s more
heavily involved, although it is doubtful whether they did m u c h
more than agree with Markham's conclusions. The archives suggest that cash flow was the principal concern when making strategic decisions, with management possibly convinced that a new
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss2/2
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investment would prove profitable provided the current level of
efficiency could be maintained for an expanded output. Having
negotiated long-term leases at the time of incorporation, there
was a determination to make the investment work and, provided
financial stability could be maintained, management remained
confident that the company could outperform its rivals. The fact
that the company was incorporated at what proved to be a low
capitalization [Edwards and Boyns, 1994, p. 1156] no doubt
helped in this direction.
Concerning the nature and purpose of the routinely prepared reports, we find at Staveley between 1838-1900, in common with the position between 1690-1783, the complete integration of the cost and financial records; the use of transfer prices
to measure departmental profits; and the use of unit costs, analyzed in detail, for comparative purposes both between activities
and over time. 39 This type of information may be compared and
contrasted with that found by Johnson [1972] at the Lyman
Mills textile company for the 1850s where an integrated cost and
financial accounting system was in use, but where it was principally concerned with building up figures for the cost of production. Johnson [1972, p. 474] concluded that such calculations
were clearly being prepared for management looking "inwards
on the shop, and not outwards on the industry." The basic aim
was to control internal plant operations; for example, to gauge
the physical productivity of the mill operatives, to assess the
impact on operations of changes in plant layout and to control
the receipt and use of raw cotton. That is, the emphasis was on
cost identification and control.
The cost accounting data at Staveley were adequate to provide an input for these kinds of decisions, but also others. In
particular, departmental profit data provided management with
the information required to assess the relative profitability of
different collieries, furnaces, foundries and ironstone pits; to
enable management to discover whether, and the extent to
which, total business costs were covered by revenues; to reach
closure decisions; and to identify the financial advantage to be
gained by squeezing out the middle man. 40 It should also be
noted that the detail appearing in the Foundry Statements and
39

Although there were these broad similarities, the a m o u n t of costing data
generated increased significantly over time.
40
The inclusion of depreciation and imputed interest, from time to time, is
further evidence of an awareness of the need to cover total costs in the long run.
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Returns Book 1856-1879 would have allowed management to
examine movements in individual costs. In other words, total
cost per unit was calculated, but there is no evidence to suggest
that management was preoccupied with this single measure as
the basis for performance assessment or decision making. Elements of direct cost per ton could be used to monitor efficiency,
while the careful observation of movements in fixed establishment costs per ton would presumably underline the advantages
of working at full capacity.
The lack of surviving evidence of the use made of routinely
prepared costing data is disappointing but, perhaps, unsurprising. The questions which such evidence would have been
expected to illuminate; e.g., the degree of waste and inefficiency,
were matters principally for the consideration of m a n a g e r s
lower down the managerial hierarchy. We might expect that, in
circumstances free from any constitutional obligation to retain a
formal record of what was said (such as the obligation to record
the meetings of boards of directors in robust minute books),
communication of information was often by word of m o u t h or
in a written form less likely to have stood the test of time. Nevertheless, we can see from evidence occasionally recorded in the
minute books that Markham was fully familiar with the cost of
operations both at Staveley and elsewhere.
We are perhaps able to gain further insight into the purpose
of Staveley's accounting system from contemporary assessments
m a d e by two distinguished scholars. According to R o b e r t
Hamilton (1788), Professor of Philosophy in the Marischal College, Aberdeen, "When a person is engaged in several branches
of manufacturer, whether on different materials, or on the same
materials through several successive stages, he should keep his
books in such a m a n n e r as to exhibit the gain or loss on each"
[quoted in Solomons, 1952, p.6]. While, according to Charles
Babbage [1832, p. 203], Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at
the University of Cambridge from 1828 to 1839:
The great competition introduced by machinery, and
the application of the principle of the sub-division of
labour, render it necessary for each producer to be continually on the watch, to discover improved methods by
which the cost of the article he manufacturers may be
reduced; and, with this view, it is of great importance to
know the precise expense of every process, as well as of
the wear and tear of machinery which is due to it . . .
One of the first advantages which suggests itself as
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss2/2
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likely to arise from a correct analysis of the expense of
the several processes of any manufacture, is the indication which it would furnish of the course in which improvement should be directed.
It is clear that the system at Staveley was capable of satisfying
these kinds of priorities fairly well.
The Process of Accounting

Innovation

In The Visible Hand [1977], Chandler's survey of the extant
literature led him to conclude that, Springfield Armory and the
railways aside, U.S. accounting systems were little concerned
with costing matters until the 1850s when, as noted above, managers at the Lyman Mills pioneered important new developments. We have seen that Hoskin and Macve have since reexamined the significance of developments at the Springfield
Armory in the light of "the West Point connection" and concluded that they paved the way for revolutionizing accountability b a s e d on t h e m e a s u r e m e n t of the productivity of t h e
workforce.
By the 1880s, considerable cost accounting progress had
undoubtedly been made in the U.S., and cost sheets prepared for
the Carnegie steel company were found to be far more detailed
and accurate than the system of cost controls in the leading
textile companies and elsewhere [Chandler, 1977, p. 268]. Of
relevance for the Hoskin and Macve thesis is the observation
made by a contemporary worker at Carnegie that "The m e n felt
and often remarked that the eyes of the company were always
on them through the books" [quoted Ibid., p. 268]. But there
were other, and wider, applications for the accounting system
which, Chandler [Ibid.] judged, included "the evaluation of the
performance of departmental managers, foremen, and men"; "to
check the quality and mix of raw materials"; "to evaluate improvements in process and in product"; "to make decisions on
developing by-products"; to price "nonstandardized items"; and
to help decide whether or not to "accept a contract". Our study
of the accounting system operated at Staveley shows that, in
Britain, costing developments started far earlier and in certain
important respects went beyond those revealed by Johnson's
[1972] examination of the Lyman Mills records even if, by 1880,
they had not achieved the sophistication of data generated at
Carnegie. Nevertheless, while the system operated at Staveley
from 1690 to 1900 exhibits substantial continuity, it also exhibPublished by eGrove, 1995
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its changes made in response to new business and organizational circumstances.
These findings also require us to modify the interpretation
placed on what Solomons [1952, p. 17] has termed "The Costing
Renaissance." The starting date of the Staveley records, 1690,
predates the first known text on double entry bookkeeping
which gives consideration to tracking internal flows of goods
[Collins, 1697]. This pioneering text was followed by just a
handful of publications [cited in Solomons, 1952, pp. 4-17;
Edwards, 1989, pp. 313-14] over a period of almost 200 years
which considered the implications of adapting techniques developed for a mercantile economy to industrial needs. Nevertheless, industrial concerns such as Staveley were using costing
t e c h n i q u e s and developing t h e m as the need arose. T h u s
Solomons' suggestion that "to a great extent they [the authors
cited] were only rediscovering ideas that were becoming of practical importance for the first time, but which could certainly have
been found, though perhaps in an undeveloped state, in earlier
works" [1952, p. 17, emphasis added] needs to be elaborted,
since it is becoming increasingly clear that the rediscovery suggested by Solomons was, in fact, confined to the literature.
The evolution of Staveley's cost accounting system, commencing seven years before the publication of Collins' text, can
be seen as a perfectly natural process which may have been
replicated elsewhere in Britain as well as in other countries of
the world. In such cases there was a need for neither a "rediscovery" nor a "renaissance" in cost accounting; the managers
were convinced of the value of costing information throughout.
This demand/response explanation for accounting development
is recognized as a driving force also in the U.S., where railway
managers were aware of the need for a constant flow of information as a prerequisite for efficient railroad operation. This
brought a revolution in accounting; more precisely, it
contributed substantially to the emergence of accounting out of bookkeeping. The techniques of Italian
double-entry bookkeeping generated the data needed,
but these data, required in far larger quantities and in
more systematic form, were then subjected to types of
analysis that were new. In sum, to meet the needs of
managing the first modern business enterprise, managers of large American railroads during the 1850's and
1860's invented nearly all the basic techniques of modern accounting [Chandler, 1977, p. 109].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss2/2
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We do not claim that Staveley's system met all the managers'
financial information requirements, 4 1 nor even that it was as
good as it should have been. For example, we find no explicit
evidence of the employment of standards or "norms". Neither
have we been able to tie down the method of overhead apportionment in all cases. However, we do find evidence of an endeavor to establish causal relationships (what are referred to
today as "cost drivers"), while the use of "norms" based on trial
r u n s h a s b e e n discovered e l s e w h e r e in far e a r l i e r t i m e s
[Edwards, Hammersley and Newell, 1990], and we might speculate that similar experiments provided yardsticks at Staveley. In
other words, the detailed cost and yield calculations may have
benefitted from comparisons with norms as well as between
time and activity.
The findings from this research go beyond the question of
the type of the calculations made and their usefulness for the
purpose of decision making. They also suggest the need to reexamine the nature of the development of cost accounting and
to incorporate in that re-examination a recognition of the fact
that similar explanations may well not apply to developments in
both Britain and the United States due, for example, to the differential circumstances of industrial development, particularly
the fact that industrialization occurred earlier and at a steadier
rate in Britain, and that the labor market possibly exhibited
different characteristics in the two countries.
Attention must also be paid to changes in business conditions, and their impact assessed. The circumstances at Staveley
over a period in excess of 300 years demonstrate important similarities and dissimilarities. The works comprised an integrated
business operation throughout, with ironstone pits, furnaces
41

The problems that growing industrialization produced for industry were
listed by Edwards (1937), including the following which, one imagines, would
have worried management at Staveley — the need to control, supervise and pay
large numbers of employees; the need for cost and output details relating to
various processes as a check on waste and inefficiency; the need to know prime
costs so that decisions about price-cutting could be made when d e m a n d was
slack. Edwards also commented on the importance of interest as an element of
total fixed cost with it being estimated that, by about 1833, interest accounted
for about one quarter of a cost of bar iron. We might add that management
would also have been interested in total costs to assess the extent to which these
were covered by prices and to judge the company's ability to survive and prosper
in the long run. (This matter did not receive emphasis from Edwards who was a
determined advocate of marginal cost and a severe critic of the arbitrary apportionment of overheads.)
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and foundries' common features. Important changes occurred
over time, however, which included the following: charcoal purchased from outside producers was replaced as a source of fuel
by coal supplied from collieries owned by the company; the
production of pots and pans for domestic use was replaced by
cast iron pipes for a business and municipal market; and the
slitting mill used in earlier times to convert bar-iron into nails
was closed down. The scale of operations, of course, increased
enormously with pig-iron production rising from approximately
500 tons in the 1750s to 132,000 tons in 1900, while coal production increased from zero to 1.8m tons per annum, the bulk
of which was sold to contribute the major proportion of the
company's reported profit at the later date. Judged against this
latter criterion, we can conclude that the accounting system at
Staveley displayed a high degree of continuity and, with little
evident difficulty, was adapted to meet perceived management
requirements in an evolving organizational structure which produced massive growth in the scale and scope of operations and
numbers employed.
The Need for Further Research
What is the significance of this study for the present debate
concerning the nature of management accounting development?
On the whole, we see it as providing greater support for economic rationalist rather than Foucauldian-based explanations.
This does not mean that we disagree with conclusions reached
concerning the importance of events at West Point and the
Springfield Armory for the development of managerialism, nor
that "the development of cost and management accounting [in
the U.S.A.] might be traced to the influence of the engineering
graduates of the military academy at West Point" [Hoskin and
Macve, 1988, pp. 37-8]. 42 However, we do question whether the
case made by Hoskin and Macve is in certain respects overstated, and whether they have underestimated the significance
of events elsewhere for the development of management accounting. For example, is there sufficiently strong evidence to
justify their claim that the "birth of accounting out of bookkeeping" in terms of the disciplinary effect on workers [1988,
p.68] is sustainable? The uses to which accounting information

42
We have noted in this paper that Britain looked to the U.S.A in 1950 for
leadership in the development of management accounting systems.
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is put are many and various, including pricing, preparing estimates, measuring the profitability of departments and products,
calculating the yield from material inputs, identifying waste and
pilferage, assessing labor efficiency and helping management
make investment decisions. These seem to go far beyond concerns with "human accountability" [1988, p.37] which is the
essence of the Hoskin and Macve thesis.
We have shown that costing information capable of illuminating many of the above management problems was produced
at Staveley and, in a few cases, we have been able to cite clear
evidence of the way in which it was used in relation thereto. We
therefore conclude that Staveley's accounting function, despite
the lack of explicit attention to h u m a n accountability, comprised a system of management accounting within the definition
of that term laid down in the 1950 Productivity Report. 43 Nevertheless, we would agree that the reasons for the apparent failure
to impose labor norms and measure deviations therefrom is a
matter which requires further investigation since it may possibly
be a factor which helps explain Britain's relative economic decline after 1870.44 Whereas systems of scientific management
were adopted rapidly in the United States under the influence of
Frederick Taylor and others, it is not until the 1920s that we find
evidence of them being introduced in Britain [Littler, 1982] or of
any attention being devoted to standard costing in the British
literature [Stelling, 1924; Renold, 1927]. 45 The existing evidence
suggests that, during the period covered by this paper, British
management preferred to rely on some combination of subcontracting, piece rates and direct supervision to achieve adequate
labor efficiency, and the question of whether British management either considered it desirable or practical to impose disciplinary control through norms is a topic worthy of investigation.
At Staveley, concern with waste and efficiency, to the extent that
this extended to the performance of labor, appears to have relied
on observations of changes in the wages of different categories
of labor per unit of output. The extent to which this served as a
43

Comparable wordings can be found in modern management accounting

texts.
44

Current knowledge on this issue in the British context remains limited.
Certainly, it does not seem sufficient to justify Locke's [1979a; 1979b] conclusion
that inferior accounting technology was a significant factor explaining Britain's
poor relative performance.
45
Progress was even slower in France with standard costing not receiving
widespread adoption until the 1960s.

Published by eGrove, 1995

37

38

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 22 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 2

The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1995

spur to action is largely hidden from researchers into this
archive and must await the discovery of more revealing primary
data.
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